Battle of Þalgiris - Grünewald - Tannenberg (1410)

A brief summary
On the 15th July 2010 it will be 600 years since the Battle of Þalgiris (Grunewald or Grünewald in Polish, Tannenberg in German). The battle, fought in 1410, lasted ten hours - from approx. 9AM into the evening. The battle, one of the major ones in the Middle Ages, was fought in that part of ancient Prussia which now belongs to Poland. The remaining part of old Prussian territory, including the city and region of Königsberg (Kaliningrad), has been occupied by Soviet Russia after WW II. Today, in 2006, it is still occupied by Russia.



The celebrated painting in 1878 of the Battle of Tannenberg with Vytautas in the centre by Jan Matejko. Courtesy Wikipedia

The protagonists
The main protagonists were the Order of the Teutonic Knights, guest knights from Europe, mercenaries, armed town and country folk in the Order’s occupied lands. (It should be noted that the Order of the Teutonic Knights was founded in Palestine in 1190 and came to Prussia in 1230 by the invitation of the Mazovian Duke Conrad to convert the warlike heathen Prussians to Christianity).
Opposing them were Polish and Lithuanian armies. The latter included three banners from Smolensk and small contingents from Russian lands subject to Lithuanian sovereignty in the Lithuanian Empire. Besides these armies there were contingents of Tartars and Czech mercenaries, among them the famous leader Jan Þiþka. The Lithuanian king of Poland, Jogaila (Jagiello), hired the Czech mercenaries, with funds supplied by the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas. (Vytautas’ title was officially recorded in documents from 1394).

The battle is reenacted on the old battle field. Photo courtesy Wikipedia
What were the main reasons for the Order to wage this war?

The official reasons were:
The Order maintained that their primary reason was to fight against the heathen, notwithstanding the fact that Lithuanians became Christians in 1387. However, Christianity had not deeply penetrated into the population, especially in the region known as Þemaitija (Samogitia) that was only ceded on paper, and not in actual fact, to the Order in the treaties in 1380, 1382, 1384, 1398 and 1404. (Lithuania defended Þemaitija (Samogitia) and other regions of Lithuania for approximately 180 years, hence these treaties).
Secondly, the Order maintained that Vytautas, who had made treaties with schismatic Russians (Orthodox) and heathen Tartars and Turks, was threatening the expansion of the Order eastwards into schismatic and heathen occupied lands.
Thirdly, that the expansion of infidels, presumably Tartars and others, were threatening Europe.
Fourthly, that Lithuanians constantly attacked the lands of the Teutonic Knights and that the Order was obliged to defend their people and their lands.

Lithuanian and Polish army veterans meet up
at the Þalgiris monument on the site of the battle.
Photo courtesy www.xxiamzius.lt 27/7/05
The unofficial reasons were:
The territorial expansion to East and South Europe, consolidation of their expansion and diplomatic success of the Teutonic Order. It must be mentioned that Pope Bonifatius IX had forbidden waging war on Lithuania to the Order on September 9, 1403. However, as the Order was seeing the region of Þemaitija (Samogitia was a part of Lithuania) slipping from its grip, it tried to compensate by conquering the Polish land of Dobrzyn. One can surmise that in taking Dobrzyn away from Poland, the Order hoped to force king Jogaila of Poland to withold his military help to Lithuania and thus be in the position to reconquer Þemaitija (Samogitia) and other lands in Lithuania.
As far as diplomatic success was concerned, the Order was keen to overthrow the tutelage of the Pope and bring to nought the mediations of the Luxemburgers (the Kings of Bohemia and Hungary) in this matter.

What were the reasons for the Lithuanians and Poles to wage this war?
For Lithuania and Poland it was of the utmost importance to ally and to pool their armies and resources that would enable them to strike a decisive blow to the expanding might of the Teutonic Knights. For the Lithuanians it was a do or die question, as they had been repulsing the ever advancing Teutonic knights, who kept on conquering their lands, pillaging and burning down their defensive wooden castles, towns and villages. And most importantly for Lithuanians and Poles, the Order was building strong brick defensive castles along the waterways and lands and penetrating deep into the territories of both countries.

What side did West European rulers generally support?
The West sided with the Order. Not even Grand Duke Vytautas’ and his cousin’s, Poland’s king Jogaila’s, letters to the West on September 9, 1409, in which they accused the Order of failing to christianise the heathens in their occupied lands, swayed the West. This was a moral accusation in direct contradiction going to the very core of the Order’s existence and duties. Yet, if it didn’t change the westerners opinion, it may have contributed to the lesser number of foreign knights enlisting in this "crusade" compared to the many previous ones. Another reason might have been the Hundred Years War (1337 - 1453) between France and England that was still raging in France.

The Leaders in the Battle

The Order of the Teutonic Knights
The Knights were led by Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, his deputy Kuno von Lichtenstein, the Grand Marshal Friedrich von Wallenrode, Grand Commissary count Albrecht von Schwarzburg, Grand Treasurer Thomas von Merheim and many Kompturs, Vogte (Fogts). It should be mentioned that numbers in each banner can’t be established with absolute certainty. Most modern estimates put the Order’s army at about 52 banners, i.e. 21 thousand cavalry and 11 thousand infantrymen.

The Lithuanians and the Poles
The king of Poland, Jogaila (Jagiello), was the titular leader of the battle. The Polish army consisted of about 51 banners, i.e. 28-29 thousand cavalry and 4 thousand infantry. They were led not by king Jogaila, but by Marshal Zbignew Brzeze and Zindram Maszkowice.
The Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas was the overall strategic leader of the battle. The Lithuanian army consisted of some 40 banners, ie 11 thousand Lithuanian and 1,5 thousand Tartar, some Wallachian and Serbian cavalry and some infantry soldiers. This number included the 3 banners from Smolensk led by Lengvenis (Lengven), Jogaila’s brother and Vytautas’ cousin. Lengvenis (Lengven) was also Vytautas’ deputy of the Lithuanian army.
One must, however, note that various historians disagree on the number of combatants on the field. To give but two examples: the Lithuanian historian Meèislovas Juèas maintains that the Lithuanian - Polish army had from 25-30 thousand warriors ("Tannenberger Schlacht - Zusammenfassung". Summary in German of - Þalgirio mûðis"). Stephen Turnbull maintains that the number of men could have been 66,000 on both sides - "... 27,000 of the Order and 39,000 who fought for Poland Lithuania" (Tannenberg 1410: Disaster for the Teutonic Knights)

The deployment of the armies at the beginning of the Battle of Tannenberg.
Plan courtesy Martin Davis, www.grognard.com/zines/ph/p0304.html
Battleground, Provisions and Arms
The Polish-Lithuanian allies seemed to have had more arms (but technically inferior to the Order’s arms), horses, supplies, fodder and provisions.The allies were much more mobile in swampy or wooded places than the heavily ironclad knights. But in open fields the knights of the Order had the upper hand and their charges were well-nigh invincible. Hence the battleground was of the Order’s choosing and greatly advantaging their cavalery charges. Both sides had artillery - a type of a canon, but it couldn’t be effectively used in this battle on account of the heavy rain that had made the ground soggy. It appears, however, that the Teutonic Knights managed to fire a few shots at the beginning of the battle. The Knights had lances, swords and shields. Their ground troops, usually mercenaries, were equipped with arbalests (cross-bows, usually cocked by mechanical means and much superior to their opponents’ Polish-Lithuanian infantry’s bows and arrows). The allied armies and their helpers although better equipped with provisions and more banners had, nevertheless, inferior arms.

The Stages of the Battle
The battle commenced at 9am. Apparently there was an initial skirmishing of the cavalry units of the Knights and the Lithuanians. That seems to have been the moment when the Knights shot a few cannon shots into the advancing Lithuanian army which were rather ineffectual. This was followed by a fierce engagement of both sides. As a consequence the Lithuanians seemed to retreat, pursued by the Knights led by Conrad von Wallenrode. (This retreat will be discussed further in this article.)
In the meantime the returning Wallenrode Knights, who had ceased their pursuit of the Lithuanians, attacked the Polish army. Ian Heath describes the following stages of the battle in his book "Armies of the Middle Ages, Volume 2":

"...Eventually, when a great melee for the Polish royal banner ended in favour of the Poles, the psychological advantage shifted, and the Hochmeister (Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen. Authors) had to commit his reserve of 16 banners (plus his own) in order to try and retrieve the situation. At much the same time the Polish infantry came in on the Knights’ right flank and began to inflict considerable slaughter amongst the crowded, immobilised horsemen. Soon afterwards the Lithuanians, having rallied on the shores of Lake Lubicz, charged in on the Order’s rear, so that the Knights were all but encircled. Other Lithuanians were meanwhile sacking the Order’s camp and slaughtering its infantry. The battle then degenerated into a massacre, as the numerical superiority of the Polish-Lithuanian forces finally took effect on the trapped Knights. Their organised resistance collapsing on the death of the Hochmeister... "

Before the battle. Courtesy Wikipedia
Start of the battle. Courtesy Wikipedia
The battle progresses. Courtesy Wikipedia
Last stage of he battle. Courtesy Wikipedia
The reasons for the Order’s defeat
From the juxtapposition of the forces and equipment of both sides, one would expect the Order to be the victor in this battle. And yet the Order was decisively crushed and lost its Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen and the above mentioned knights, as well as many kompturs, foreign knights, mercenaries and many of their armed town and country people. What then contributed to the Teutonic Knights’ defeat?
This question has been for a long time misinterpreted by Polish and other historians.Their main source must have been the Annales of Jan Dlugosz "Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronica inclitii Regni Poloniae 1455-1480" Unfortunately for the Lithuanian side, Dlugosz’s account of the battle was biased, as later historians have proved. He maintained that the Lithuanian army fled the open battle field after an hour fighting, due to the superior might of the cavalry charge by the Knights. In fact, he even wrote that the army fled all the way to Lithuania, where it spread the rumours of defeat and gloom. Dlugosz maintained that it was the Polish army who won the victory by fighting valiantly in this battle. He also mentions Lengvenis (Lengven) and the banners Smolensk that fought with great courage, while the Lithuanians fled in great shame. While it is true that Lengvenis and his three banners fought valiantly - it is mentioned also in other documents - Dlugosz’s statement about the flight of the Lithuanian army and the fact that Grand Duke Vytautas tried to stop them are disputable. This account cannot be squared with the "Cronica conflictus" ( 1410 - 1411) description, in which we find a more sober depiction of the beginning of the battle. The Cronica mentions that the Lithuanians retreated under the heavy assault of the Knights, but that they returned to the battle field later.

The alledged flight of the Lithuanian army during the battle
Firstly it is highly improbable that an army of close to 40 banners (some banners were left in the reserve) could flee in one go. Otherwise the battle would have been well nigh over.
Secondly, it is hard to imagine how Grand Duke Vytautas could freely ride around in the height of a fierce battle and exhort the troops to stand their ground as Dlugosz stated.
Thirdly, Dlugosz contradicts himself when he mentions that the Polish and Lithuanian armies were united on their way to surround Marienburg, the main castle of the Order. How could they, if they had fled all the way to Lithuania, as Dlugosz had stated earlier?
It is also known that the Lithuanians must have been fighting gallantly for they lost a great deal more men than the Poles. Actually close to half the Lithuanian army returned home. This is documented in King Jogaila’s letters to Archbishop Michael Kurowski and Bishop Albert of Posnan. It says: " ...paucis valde nostris communibus, nullis notabilibus interfectis". Furthermore, the historians Z.Kujot, V. Majewski and E. Ekdahl have a quite different interpretation of the alleged "flight".
The Swedish professor of Baltic history, Sven Ekdahl, has found in 1963 in the archives of the Order transferred to Göttingen and now in Berlin, an addenda in old German to a letter addressed to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. A signature and date are missing. However, from the address of "liber her meister" and the contents of the letter it is clear that it is about the battle of Tannenberg "grossen streythe". Furthermore, it contains a twice repeated dire warning "...not to allow warriors to pursue an enemy in flight and thus to abandon their banners. A fleeing enemy could be simply executing a manoeuvre to entice the Knights to pursue them individually and thus break their ranks... ". It is also very interesting that in the addenda the mention is made of guest Knights, who are ignorant of such military manoeuvres (which apparently happened in Tannenberg. Authors).(This addenda to a letter was found in the Secret Prussian Cultural Heritage in Berlin, in the XXth section among the Order’s correspondence, marked No 2024 and in the Register of E. Joachim and W. Hubatsch it is contained under the title "Advice in battle".)
This find now clarifies the alleged "flight" of the Lithuanians. It was a well calculated military ruse to break the might of the charging iron clad cavalry of the knights on their chosen battlefield. That is also the reason why King Jogaila was delaying the entry of the Polish army into the battle in order to allow enough time for the Lithuanian army to weaken the enemy onslaught and to entice the Knights to pursue the Lithuanians, who pretended to flee. This is why Lengvenis (Lengven) and the three banners from Smolensk were defending the Polish army with great valour, in order to allow the Lithuanians enough time to surround the pursuing Knights and to attack them from the rear when least expected. Finally it allowed the rested and strongest knight units of the Polish army on the left flank to enter the battle with great force. Thus the alleged Lithuanian "flight" on the right side of the allied armies was a well calculated manoeuvre to defeat the order on an open field. Such a manoeuvre must have been decided beforehand among the allies.
Although it was a decisive victory, it didn’t mean the end of the Oder in Prussia. It took many more years and battles between the Order and Poland and Lithuania. In fact it took about 100 years until in 1525 the Order became secularised under Margrave Albrecht von Hohenzollern of Brandenburg and embraced Protestantism.

Isolde Ira Poþelaitë - Davis AM and Vytautas Pataðius
Sydney, 15.09.2006

Bibliography
  1. "Þalgiris" by Sven Ekldahl, translated into Lithuanian by Darius Baronas & Vidas Dolinskas, Baltos lankos, Vilnius, 1999. The original version in German: "Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410". Quellenkritische Untersuchungen, t.I: Text mit Anhang und Erläuterungen, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz 23/1 Köln, Wien, 1988.
  2. "Tannenberg 1410 - 1914" by Geoffrey Evans, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1970.
  3. "Armies of the Middle Ages, Volume 2" by Ian Heath, Flexiprint Ltd, Worthing, Sussex, 1984.
  4. "Tannenberg" by Constantine R. Jurgela, PhD, Franciscan Fathers, New York, 1961.
  5. "Tannenberg 1410: Disaster for the Teutonic Knights" by Stephen Turnbull, illustrated by Richard Hook, Osprey Publishing Ltd. U.K. 2003.